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FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 
THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 
WAYNE ABERNATHY: 
Good afternoon, everyone. Glad to have you here for our session. 
My name is Wayne Abernathy, I’m executive Vice President for Financial 
Institutions Policy at The American Bankers Association but here at the 
Federalist Society I am the chairman of the Financial Services Practice 
group, who is sponsoring this session today. Financial Regulation: The 
Apotheosis of the Administrative State. This is a long term for a very 
important topic, and we very much appreciate you being here to listen from 
our very experienced, distinguished, and insightful panel.  
 By the way, if you happen to be interested in the work of the 
Financial Services Practice group at the Federalist Society, please contact 
me or one of the officers of the Federalist Society and we can get you 
involved. Love to have as many people involved as possible. 
 And now my important duty besides that is to introduce our 
moderator for today, Judge Carlos Bea. Judge Carlos Bea serves as a judge 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He received his 
bachelor’s degree from Stanford University, and his J.D. from Stanford Law 
School. Judge Bea was born in San Sebastian, Spain, and immigrated with 
his family to Cuba in 1939. In 1952, you might not notice it unless he stands 
up, then of course you will. Judge Bea served on the Cuban national 
basketball team at the Helsinki Olympics. Wish I could do that. 
 Judge Bea became a naturalized citizen of the United State in 1958. 
He taught courses in civil litigation, advocacy at Hastings Law College of 
Law and Stanford Law School. From 1990 to 2003, Judge Bea served as 
judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. Judge Bea was nominated by 
President George W. Bush to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and confirmed in 2003. Please welcome Judge Bea. 
JUDGE BEA: 
Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I think that we’re 
required to give disclaimers at this point. I played in the Olympic games in 
‘52, but I was a tourist. We went two and five in the games. I’m happy to say 
our son, Sebastian, however, is a real athlete. He won a silver medal in 
Sydney, in the men’s pair for the United States.  
 Also, I don’t want there to be any misconceptions. A gentleman 
walked up to me recently at a cocktail party and said, “I greatly admire the 
opinions you write,” and I told him that I thought he was operating under a 
case of mistaken identity, because I write only dissents on the Ninth Circuit. 
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 Today’s subject, financial regulation: the apotheosis of the 
administrative state is concerned with a regulatory state, often focuses on 
reforms of formal institution structures and legal doctrines such as the 
Chevron Deference. But arguably, these formal constraints are only the tip 
of the iceberg regarding the issues of individual liberty and the rule of law 
raised by concerns of the regulatory state. 
 We have a distinguished set of panelists today. Knowledgeable 
about the financial industry, financial regulations, and the effect of the 
administrative state. Your programs will have extensive resumes and 
biographies, and I will essentially give you name, rank, and serial number.  
 To my right Professor Hal Scott, Nomura Professor of International 
Financial Systems and Director of the Committee on Capital Regulations at 
the Harvard Law School. Professor Scott will talk on contagion, a nicer word 
than panic, that can cause a run on economic system as being at the heart of 
the 2008 Great Financial Recession, how the crisis was ended by the Federal 
Reserve System acting as a lender-of-last-resort to banks and non-banks, and 
using other tools, and how the Dodd-Frank legislation may impede such 
future actions by the feds in the future if they’re necessary. 
 Next will be Arthur Wilmarth, a Professor of Law at George 
Washington Law School who describes himself as a conservative with a 
small “c.” Professor Wilmarth will discuss the need to prevent the creation 
of government-sponsored enterprises, GSE’s, and of measures that allow the 
creation of firms that are too big to fail. How we should limit federal safety 
nets and federal subsidies, and how we should take another look at universal 
banking, the combination of banks, security firms, and insurers into one 
entity, and perhaps consider the merits of the former Glass-Steagall 
legislation. 
 To my left is Peter Wallison, Senior Fellow and Burns Fellow in 
Financial Policy of the American Enterprise Institute, who is currently 
writing a book on the growth of the administrative state. Mr. Wallison will 
discuss a system for the designation of firms as systemically important 
financial institutions, or SIFI’s, by the Dodd-Frank Act1 that’s created the 
financial security oversight council to include banks and non-banks. The 
standards, or lack of standards, used to designate firms and the effect of such 
designation as an example of the growth of standard administration power. 
                                                 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78o). 
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 Last, but not least: Professor Richard Epstein. The Tisch Professor 
at NYU Law School, senior lecturer at Chicago Law School, and Bedford 
Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution whose most recent book is The Classical 
Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government. 
Professor Epstein will center his remarks on the recent case of PHH versus 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was in the D.C. Circuit and 
was granted en banc review, and whether administrative agencies can be 
insulated from legislative, presidential, and judicial review. He will talk 
about the guaranteed budget of the Bureau from the Federal Reserve and how 
this bureau fits in with the independent agencies and multiple board 
members. 
  With that we give way to Professor Scott. 
MR. SCOTT: 
So, it’s my pleasure to be here today. Contagion, which is a run on 
the financial system, was the heart of the 2008 financial crisis, and others in 
the past. The crisis was halted in large part by The Fed’s provision of lender-
of-last-resort assistance to non-banks as well as banks.  
 Lehman’s failure generated a run on the market money funds, 
whether or not exposed to Lehman, which then quickly spread to all short-
term funding in the financial system including commercial paper issued by 
non-financials, and funding of major investment banks, and bank-affiliated 
broker deals.  
 The Fed responded by creating new facilities under Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act2 to lend to these institutions. In addition, the FDIC 
raised deposit insurance levels from $100,000 to $250,000, and to infinity 
on demand deposit accounts so crucial to the payment system and the 
economy. 
 It also guaranteed senior debt of depository institutions, further 
assuring their access to funding. Treasury used its exchange stabilization 
fund to guarantee money market funds, and then ultimately Congress enacted 
the TARP, which was used to provide capital injections into the banks.  
 Now these measures stopped the crisis, but in the aftermath were 
criticized as propagating moral hazard and bailing out Wall Street. Now, I 
do not regard the use of a lender-of-last-resort where there is good collateral 
and a penalty rate as a bailout. Nor do I regard deposit insurance as a bailout, 
but both are clearly government support. Yet in my view, highly desirable.  
                                                 
2 Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2115 (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 343). 
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 TARP is a bailout and should only be available if the failure of many 
large, important financial institutions at the same time would heavily impact 
the economy where their resolution as a group is not a viable option.  
 Now, there is potential moral hazard from all of these measures, but 
in the case of lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance it is small. I do not 
see how institutions, which are victims of panic runs, which is often the case 
with contagion, as opposed to bad business decisions, will take more risk as 
a result of such support.  
 Do homeowners expose their buildings to the threat of fire from their 
neighbors because of the existence of a fire department? I don’t think so. 
And we attempt, albeit imperfectly, to minimize the moral hazard from 
deposit insurance by charging premiums based on the riskiness of the 
insured, albeit that’s a very difficult task to do. 
 But due to bailout concerns, major restrictions were placed on the 
measures we took during the crisis. First TARP abolished the Treasury 
authority to use The Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee the money 
market funds.  
 Dodd-Frank then placed major restrictions on the use of 13(3), of the 
Federal Reserve Act, to provide assistance to non-banks. Although, 
interestingly, the discount window, Section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act, 
continued to be available to banks without major restrictions.  
 Now what are these restrictions under 13(3) that apply to non-banks? 
By the way, non-banks today, in terms of runnables, short-term liabilities, 
account for about 66% of all runnable liabilities in the system, and they’re 
going to grow as we see more and more disintermediation from the banking 
system into so-called “shadow banking.”  
 So, the ability to lend to non-banks was important in 2008 and will 
be even more important in the future.  
 What are the restrictions that were put on the Fed?  The Fed can only 
lend to non-banks with the approval of the Secretary of Treasury, 
significantly limiting Fed independence. By the way, such approval is not 
required under the discount window for banks. Such loans must be part of a 
“broad program,” which may mean under The Fed’s own regulation, that 
implements this section, that the Fed must wait for five institutions to be in 
trouble, thus making it harder to nip contagion in the bud. 
 Third, collateral is required for all loans. Previously, loans had to be 
collateralized to the satisfaction of the Fed, which allowed them to buy 
unsecured, highly-rated commercial paper from non-financials during the 
crisis. 
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 Fourth, the Fed can only lend to a solvent borrower, which is a sound 
principle, but difficult to actually determine in a crisis where asset values are 
uncertain. 
 Fifth, loans to non-banks must be disclosed within seven days to the 
Chairmen of the House Financial Services and Senate Banking Committees, 
with the attendant risk that they may leak out, thus deterring borrowers from 
obtaining loans in the first place or accelerating the run when the news does 
leak.  
 Sixth, banks can no longer freely pass onto their broker-dealer 
affiliates loans obtained from the discount window, instead such pass-
throughs are now subject to 23(A) of the Federal Reserve Act, which allows 
them only to be ten percent of the bank’s capital. And even further 
restrictions on 13(3) have since been passed by the House although not by 
the Senate. 
 In addition, the FDIC’s authority to raise deposit insurance limits in 
crisis have been taken away, only to be restored upon request by FDIC 
through a joint resolution of Congress, making it impractical in a timely way, 
and the authority to make new loans under TARP has expired. 
 So, let me just say a few words about lender-of-last-resort. Am I 
happy with how the Fed operates as a lender-of-last-resort? No. 
 First, we need better coordination between fiscal authorities, the 
Treasury and the Fed, where there is a reasonable possibility that the 
borrower may be insolvent, or clearly is insolvent, as was the case with AIG. 
At the very least, we should regard any investment in equity by the Fed as 
outside their authority, which of course they did in AIG. That should be a 
fiscal decision reserved for the Treasury.  
 Second, we need more of a rule of law for the operations of the Fed 
as lender-in-last-resort, in the sense that the Fed should articulate its general 
policies, including facilities and programs, how they determine solvency, 
what a broad program really is, penalty rates, collateral, et cetera. Not only 
is ambiguity not constructive in this instance, it is positively harmful. With 
weapons deployed in advance, the very use of a lender-of-last-resort might 
not be necessary.  
 This is a lesson from Draghi’s Eurozone declaration, that the ECB 
would do whatever it takes to stop contagion. Critics legitimately criticize 
the Fed for operating without articulated constraints and doing so in a non-
transparent way. This is not tenable if the Fed is to have support for the 
powers it needs. A rule of law need not unduly confine discretion but should 
articulate the principles for exercising such discretion.  
 Finally, I would require that those institutions borrowing from the 
Fed, or receiving fiscal report, pay a sensible price, particularly where their 
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own losses trigger the need for support. And this price could range from 
penalty rates to enhanced supervision, or even the replacement of 
management. The failure to impose a cost on institutions benefiting from 
public support is a major factor for popular opposition to the use of these 
measures that we so successfully employed in 2008. Thank you.  
MR. WILMARTH: 
Good afternoon. I would like to thank The Federalist Society for 
inviting me to participate in this panel discussion.  
 Madisonian conservatives among whom I would classify myself as 
a Madisonian conservative, which I believe is equivalent to Professor 
Epstein’s reference to classical liberals. I will argue that Madisonian 
conservatives should embrace the following four principles of financial 
regulation.  
 First, we should stop allowing privately-owned financial institutions 
to operate, in effect, as government-sponsored enterprises with implicit 
federal guarantees. We all know about the disasters at Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, which were privately-owned, government-sponsored 
enterprises and imposed huge costs on the federal government and taxpayers. 
I contend that too-big-to-fail financial conglomerates are today’s 
government-sponsored enterprises.  
 Second, to be faithful to the first principle, we have to end 
government policies that encourage financial institutions to become too big 
to fail, and that reward them for doing so.  
  Third we must strictly limit the scope of the federal safety net for 
banks. Most would agree that banks perform essential social services by 
accepting deposits from savers, providing payment services, and making 
loans to small and medium-sized business firms that are not able to raise 
funds by selling securities in the capital markets. Those are legitimate and 
important functions for banks to perform.  
 Banks are subject to depositor runs, partly because they have a 
maturity mismatch between their short-term deposit liabilities, and their 
longer-term assets. The Great Depression proved, and the recent crisis also 
proved (if you look, for example, at the Northern Rock episode in the United 
Kingdom), that we need deposit insurance for chartered and supervised 
banks. 
 I also agree with Professor Scott that we need lender-of-last-resort 
assistance for chartered and supervised banks. However, I differ with him on 
whether non-banks should be given the same assistance. In my view any 
additional forms of federal support for banks should be carefully scrutinized, 
because support means subsidy.  
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  Fourth, we should oppose any federal subsidies for non-bank 
financial institutions and non-bank financial activities, because federal 
subsidies distort market pricing, provide unfair competitive advantages to 
non-bank firms that receive them, and undermine the effectiveness of market 
discipline.  
 In my view, if non-banks want to be protected by the federal safety 
net, they should become chartered banks and accept the same types of 
supervision and regulation applied to banks.  Non-banks should not expect 
to receive the same kind of federal support when they are not subject to the 
same regulation and oversight that banks must accept.  
  Universal banking, which allows banks to combine with securities 
firms and insurance companies, and to engage in a full range of capital 
markets activities, violates all four of the principles I have described. 
 The last crisis demonstrated that you cannot limit the federal safety 
net to banks when they are affiliated with non-bank firms engaged in 
significant capital markets activities. When a major crisis occurs, the federal 
government will inevitably decide to save the entire conglomerate to save 
the bank.  
 For example, the federal government provided $850 billion of 
combined support to save two giant bank-centered financial conglomerates, 
Citigroup and Bank of America. That support included capital infusions, 
lender-of-last-resort assistance, sales of commercial paper to the Federal 
Reserve, and debt guarantees provided by the FDIC. That $850 billion of 
support for Citigroup and Bank of America was only a small part of the total 
bill we paid to save troubled financial conglomerates during the financial 
crisis.  
 The problem with Dodd-Frank is that it does not change the 
universal banking model. Unlike the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which 
responded to the Great Depression by requiring banks to separate from 
securities firms, Dodd-Frank basically says, “We have these nuclear reactors 
(called universal banks) that blew up. Rather than prohibiting such reactors 
or requiring an entirely different form of reactor, let’s just improve all the 
valves and controls. If we have better valves and better controls, maybe they 
won’t blow up next time.”3 
  In my view, Dodd-Frank’s approach is unsound, and unviable. The 
last 20 years have made clear that giant financial conglomerates cannot be 
effectively managed or regulated. If we don’t change the business model of 
                                                 
3 The nuclear reactor metaphor for universal banks was borrowed from 
Neel Kashkari, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
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universal banks, I am quite sure that we will have a comparable financial 
crisis within the not-distant future.  
 I believe we have two choices. One is to adopt what I would call an 
“internal Glass-Steagall” approach, which is similar to the ring-fencing 
legislation adopted by the United Kingdom.  An “internal Glass-Steagall” 
policy would put strong firewalls around the bank and say to the bank, “You 
cannot make any loans or other transfers of funds to your affiliates, except 
for paying lawful dividends to your parent holding company.  In addition, 
the federal government is not going to protect your affiliates.”  
 That’s a defensible approach, but I think there are two big problems 
with making it work. First, will regulators actually monitor and enforce those 
firewalls over the longer term? Second, when a large financial conglomerate 
is threatened with failure, will the government actually refuse to bail out the 
affiliates outside the bank’s ring fence?  
 The second approach would be to go back to 1933 and reestablish 
an “external Glass-Steagall” policy.  That policy would say, “We want banks 
to be strictly separated from the capital markets.  We want capital markets to 
operate outside the banking system and not to depend on any subsidies 
related to the banking system.”  
 I agree with Professor Scott that we have a major problem with 
shadow banking. The problem is that non-bank companies are essentially 
engaged in taking deposits. Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which is 
still in force, provides that non-banks are prohibited from accepting any 
deposits, period. In fact, it’s a criminal offense for anyone other than a 
chartered bank to accept deposits. 
  What are deposits? They are short-term, debt instruments, payable 
at par on demand. We have trillions of dollars of de facto deposits today in 
the form of short-term commercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos), 
and money market funds.   
  I agree with Morgan Ricks, who has written a very persuasive book 
called The Money Problem.  Ricks argues that short-term money claims, 
including de facto deposits, should be limited to banks. In fact, we didn’t any 
significant volume of de facto deposits and shadow banking before 1965.  
  Regulators have ignored Section 21 over the past 50 years and have 
allowed non-banks to create massive amounts of de facto deposits, thereby 
creating the shadow banking system. De facto deposits and shadow banking 
are distorting our entire system. In addition, many shadow banks are closely 
connected to, and are often affiliated with, our big universal banking 
conglomerates. 
We have to get back to the point where we say, “If you want to issue 
a short-term debt claim, payable at par on demand, you have to be a chartered 
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and supervised bank.” Whether the dividing line for deposit status is 60 days 
or 90 days, we have to stop non-banks from issuing short-term debt claims 
that function as de facto deposits. 
  I look forward to our discussion after our presentations. Thank you. 
MR. WALLISON: 
Well, it’s a great pleasure to be here and I want to thank The Federal 
Society for sponsoring this. This is a massive organization that’s done 
wonderful work. And I’m just delighted to be a part of it. 
 I’m going to talk about basically the subject that I’m writing a book 
about now, which is the growth of the administrative state and why it has 
come about. And since I specialize in regulation of financial institutions, it 
will be from that perspective.  
 I’m going to be talking about the Dodd-Frank Act, and the 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which allows a group of financial 
regulators to designate certain institutions as systemically important 
financial institutions, and then to regulate them very strictly.  
  I’m going to go through some of the background, which many of 
you know if you are part of the regulatory process, the financial regulatory 
process, but just for those who are not, I want to go through some of the 
background here, so you will understand it.  
 The Dodd-Frank Act created a new agency called a Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC to coordinate and oversee financial 
regulation in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The agency is headed by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and consists of all the federal financial 
regulators, The Fed, the FDIC, the SCC and others, and was given the power 
to designate any non-bank financial firm, non-bank financial firm, for 
special, stringent regulation by the Federal Reserve. 
 The firms that are designated are generally described as systemically 
important financial institutions, or SIFIs because their financial structure, 
their financial failure or distress could in theory create a systemic breakdown 
in the United States economy.  
 The precise language of Section 113 of the Act says that a financial 
firm may be designated by the FSAC if its material financial distress or its 
activities could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States. 
 The provision was a response to the mistaken belief in Congress and 
elsewhere that Lehman’s bankruptcy in September 2008, caused the 
financial crisis. The idea was that large firms are interconnected, and the 
failure of one, like Lehman, will drag down others, creating a systemic 
condition. 
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To prevent this, special, stringent regulation by The Fed was 
considered necessary. In reality, however, no other firm failed as a result of 
Lehman’s failure. So, the interconnectedness theory is wrong. But the law, 
as often happens, is still in effect. Accordingly, under the material financial 
distress or activities standard, the FSOC has designated four large non-bank 
institutions: AIG, Prudential Insurance, GE Capital, and MetLife.  
 Designation can be a seriously destructive event to a firm because it 
gives The Fed virtually unlimited authority to control the firm’s business. In 
fact, after having experience[d] Fed regulation, GE virtually terminated the 
business of its huge subsidiary GE Capital, in order to hopefully eliminate 
its designation, which was successful. But at the same time, it eliminated a 
significant source of funding for small firms. 
 MetLife, on the other hand, did not agree to its designation and sued 
the FSOC in the D.C. District Court. In March 2016, the court overturned 
MetLife’s designation, and the FSOC applied to the DC Circuit, which has 
not yet rendered a decision. 
 Now, the relevance of all this about Dodd-Frank to the apotheosis, 
what a title, the apotheosis of the administrative state, and that of course 
means, all you Greeks out there know, that it means the high point of the 
administrative state. If it were the high point of the administrative state, I 
would be happy. I’m afraid it’s only the beginning.  
 To repeat the statutory language again, any non-bank financial firm 
can be designated as a SIFI and subjected to this designation this special 
regulation, if it poses a threat to the stability of the United States. The act 
contains no standards that restrict the discretion of the FSOC. There is no 
definition of material financial distress, no definition of activities, no 
definition of threat, or what was meant by “the financial stability of the 
United States.” Nor does the act contain any statement of what size a firm 
must be before it can be designated as a SIFI. 
 Yet, in the case of bank holding companies, Congress was able to 
set at least that much of a standard for these firms if a bank holding company 
has more than $50 billion in assets, it will be subject to the stringent 
regulation of The Fed as a SIFI. In other words, to designate a firm as a 
SIFI, FSOC was authorized to predict that at some unknown time in the 
future, in an unknown future, the financial distress of a particular firm or its 
activities, will have an adverse effect on the entire US financial system.  
 This is impossible to know. No matter how skilled or expert the 
members of an administrative agency might be, they cannot predict the 
future. The decision is pure discretion. Moreover, the ability to stop certain 
activities can apply to a whole industry, giving FSOC the authority to control 
whole, entire markets. 
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 But when the Congress gives these extraordinary discretionary 
powers to an administrative agency, it is further empowering the 
administrative state. The courts could stop this process, but they have not. 
Although the broad discretion given to the FSOC in this case could be 
considered an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Supreme 
Court has not invoked this concept since 1935, and many people think it’s 
simply dead.  
 One of the reasons for the court’s reluctance is that we don’t have a 
very good definition of the difference between legislation on the one hand 
and administrative action on the other. But this should not be impossible for 
a court to decide and determine in individual cases.  
 A legislative decision has one distinguishing characteristic: it can be 
wholly arbitrary, taking from some and giving to others, and does not require 
any justification as long as the Constitution is not violated.  
 Just like Congress setting a $50 billion threshold for treating a bank 
holding company as a SIFI, that’s an example of a legislative standard-
setting decision that is completely arbitrary. $50 billion makes no more sense 
than $200 billion in this context. So, bank holding companies cannot and 
have not challenged that. They’ve challenged it legislatively, they have not 
challenged it in the courts, because Congress is allowed to make those kinds 
of arbitrary decisions which an administrative agency cannot.  
 Once these key decisions are made, the administrative agency can 
be tasked to carry them out. This goes back to Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision in Wayman v. Southard in 1825, when he was also faced with this 
question of, “What’s the difference between an administrative and a 
legislative decision?” And his point was that the important issues, the 
important decisions are made by the legislature. The administrative agency 
can have some delegated responsibilities, but not for the important ones.  
 This, of course, means someone has to determine what the important 
decisions actually are, and that is the responsibility of the courts under 
Article Three of the Constitution.  
 The unwillingness of the courts to make these decisions is 
responsible for the growth of the administrative state that we have seen now 
and will see in the future. Because Congress has been happy to send difficult 
decisions to the administrative agencies. 
 The framers, it turns out, were wrong in this respect. Congress will 
not jealously guard its powers. In addition, as Chief Justice Marshall said in 
Marbury and Madison, and we heard this from the Attorney General it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what 
the law is. 
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 Yet, if anything, the Supreme Court has gone the other way. In the 
Chevron line of cases, for example, they have deferred to the administrative 
agencies’ interpretation of what Congress authorized, and in effect, they are 
allowing the agencies to say what the law is.  
 So, in the MetLife case, when MetLife won, the District Court did 
actually not give the FSOC any deference, but they didn’t decide that it had 
received excessive discretionary powers, either. Instead, it said that FSOC’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious, because it didn’t consider the costs of 
designating MetLife something actually that was not required by the statute.  
 In other words, although MetLife created an opportunity for the 
court to consider the scope of discretion Congress gave to the FSOC. This 
decision does nothing to restrain that growth.  
 Until the Supreme Court begins to use the authority to define where 
legislation ends, and administration begins, the administrative state will 
continue to grow. Thanks very much. 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Peter speaks in his usual dramatic way, and I think essentially has 
been a consistent and accurate prophet of doom over these many years. My 
job is to continue, and to see if I can find some horror story that will one-up 
his, explaining how it is that there are other horrors in the administrative 
state.  
The difference between us is I think the horrors that I’m about to talk 
about do have solutions, where the ones that he has talked about are 
extremely difficult. And the thesis that I’m going to propose using PHH 
Corporation v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau4 as a vehicle, if at 
least I can remember some of its facts, which I can, is as follows.  
  Whenever you put together an administrative agency which as an 
independent status, lawfully it can only do two things. It can issue regulations 
and it can prosecute cases, but it cannot internalize inside the organization 
the functions of a federal district court by putting together a panel or 
commission. Or, in the case of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—
I got that right, it took me a long time to memorize that—you cannot put 
                                                 
4 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
rev’d, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Circuit 2018 en banc) (decided after this panel 
conversation). See also, Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Enforcement Under 
New York’s Martin Act:  From Financial Fraud to Global Warming, 14 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 805, 810-813 (2018) (Professor Epstein discussing the 
larger issues of the administrative state). 
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these people together to give them the power to adjudicate so that the only 
kind of judicial review that you can receive is that which comes from an 
appellate court.  
 This is an issue that starts in financial regulation with the CFPB and, 
but it continues everywhere else. Many of you, I think, have followed Oil 
States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,5 case, where 
exactly the same pattern takes place, where only now it’s the PTAB, which 
is the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which is essentially designed to 
substitute for the adjudicative system. And as we heard from Attorney 
General Sessions earlier on today, separation of powers is indeed a very 
important protection of liberty, because you’d never want to have a situation, 
which one person holds all the keys to the safe, and if that person is very, 
very good, things may go pretty well. But if that person is very bad, then 
things will turn out to be horrid, and that’s the risk that you always have to 
guard again, systematically, in all these cases.  
  Now the situation that we have with the Elizabeth Warren 
legislation having to do with the CFPB, is, in fact, an absolute architectural 
masterpiece if you want to adhere to the aggressive playbook on how it is 
that administrative agencies ought to be organized. Essentially, it rests on the 
assumption that there are people out there who are disembodied experts, but 
who, in fact, often turn out to be very vigorously partisan. But the dominant 
conceit today is that what we have to do is to insulate them from political 
pressure so that they can protect the public from various kinds of private 
abuses that are going to be inflicted upon them. 
 There is no question that a very powerful metaphor in the United 
States is the relationship between Wall Street on the one hand and Main 
Street on the other hand. Wall Street is essentially thought to be an object of 
disapprobation, and therefore extensive regulation. And so, when they put 
the CFPB together, what they did is they managed to do everything within 
their power to insulate it from various kinds of oversight. They gave its head 
                                                 
5 Oil States Energy Servs., v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365 
(Apr. 24, 2018).  For further discussion on Oil States, see Richard A. Epstein, 
The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Why the Supreme Court Should 
End Inter Partes Review in Oil States, 19 FED. SOC. REV. 116 (2017); 
Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform:  Further 
Reflections on the Oil States Case after Oral Argument in the Supreme 
Court, 19 FED SOC.  REV. 124 (2018); and Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme 
Court Tackles Patent Reform:  Post-Decision Article: Inter Partes Review 
Under the AIA Undermines the Structural Protections Offered by Article III 
Courts, 19 FED. SOC. REV.132 (2018). 
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a five-year term; they gave it guaranteed budget protection by funding it 
through The Federal Reserve, and essentially, they gave the single 
commission a total autonomous power to decide cases. 
 And in the PHH case, you could see the powers that came through, 
there was a rather complicated financial transaction in which I thought 
liability was rather questionable. It had to do with the application of rules 
that had been put together by a predecessor organization and the extent to 
which they bound the CFPB. And it turns out that Mr. Cordray not only said 
that did he have the power, but unilaterally he decided to increase the fine 
from about $4 million to about $104 million, saying, as it were, “I really 
think that this is a perfectly ideal situation to give a public spanking to a 
corporation which probably committed no kind of violation at all.”  
 And then the case comes up to the District Circuit on Appeal, Judge 
Kavanaugh essentially decided that he was going to give the Congress a 
choice. He said, as it were, “If, in fact, what you want to do is to have single 
commissioner then you must be prepared to accept is that this person can 
now be removed at the pleasure of the President,” at which point the Wall 
Street Journal began a remove Cordray campaign on the grounds that he 
could be dismissed, not only for cause, but certainly at the will of the 
President. And, at the other hand, Kavanaugh said if you want to have these 
people insulated, as you may do, unfortunately, the appropriate way in which 
to do that is to have a commission which has multiple members on it so as to 
blunt the force of a single individual. 
 In my own view, this is not a perfect protection, to put it mildly, 
because if you start to look at the many commissions that are put together, 
with three-to-two majorities, the President’s party having the deciding vote, 
you discover that there’s a rigid partisan separation on virtually every major 
issue, and that the so-called expertise essentially is a cloak for very sharp 
political divisions and bias.  
  The common practice in courts of general jurisdiction is for judges 
to sit on cases by way of rotation, which makes it much less likely that you 
could have this particular sort of fixed division, and so I think, in effect, that 
the mistake in the Kavanaugh opinion was not that it went too far in trying 
to upset this particular feature of the administrative state.  Rather, I think it 
did not go far enough, and that what we have to do is to come up with a 
consistent and powerful consensus that calls for the complete separation of 
the enforcement and regulatory function on one side, and the adjudicative 
function on the other. 
 But this does not solve all of your institutional problems, to be sure. 
Because there’s then always that further question, exactly what kind of body 
do you want to put together? And there is the further question of whether 
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you want specialized courts, like those that exist in taxation or bankruptcy, 
or whether you want to put these matters in the hands of courts of general 
jurisdiction.  
 Now on that question I’m relatively agnostic, at least on this 
particular occasion, because the long terms that are associated with these 
Article I courts, I think, gives them a certain insulation from political 
pressure, and the fact that these particular judges tend to be appointed by 
judges in the judiciary rather than the President, tends to soften the very sharp 
political divisions that otherwise take place.  
 But make no mistake about it: we have agency after agency from the 
New Deal that present this very difficult situation of three-two commissions, 
or one-zero commissions, and what is the problem associated with this? 
Well, not only do you have the problem of bias, but you have the problem of 
flip-over. Every time there’s a change in a presidential administration, the 
majority now goes from one party to another, and then you see the 
commission trying to undo the particular decisions that were made 
somewhere else.  
 So, you have exactly the same thing in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as with the CFPB, and so forth. And indeed, in many ways the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is one of the worst offenders on this 
particular situation, because it has now institutionalized the process under 
which it turns out it can bring prosecutions before an administrative law 
judge of its own appointment.6  Of course, these internal do not have 
unanimous success for the SEC, but if you’re winning 97% of your cases in 
front of your own tribunal, the only conclusion that you can reach, is that 
you’re playing with, shall we say, a deck of marked cards. Socially, you do 
not want to allow that kind of a situation ever to exist. 
 So, as I have three learned companions here, all of whom spoke 
about the arcana of various issues associated with financial regulation, I’m 
basically making a rather simple-minded point that goes back to the 
principles of separation of powers at the beginning of the Republic, in 
financial areas, but it seems to me carries over pretty much everywhere else.  
It is not possible, nor even desirable, to undo the administrative state, given 
the complexity of functions that government has to discharge.  But none of 
these complexities justify the current amalgamation of adjudication, 
legislation, and prosecution in the same agency. It is critical to hive off the 
adjudicative function, and the agencies will run just fine, and the rest of the 
                                                 
6 Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) Lucia was 
decided in the Supreme Court after this talk was given. 
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public can take a deeper breath and sleep more quietly and contentedly at 
night. Thank you.  
JUDGE BEA: 
I’d like to open up the conversation among the members of the panel, 
but one thought struck me. When we first had a conference call a couple of 
weeks ago, and I was waiting for somebody to say something on this subject. 
Does anybody have anything nice to say about Dodd-Frank?  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Yes, it’s short! I have another nice thing to say about it. Most of the 
regulations under it have yet to be issued since it’s only been seven years 
since its adoption. 
 
JUDGE BEA: 
Alright. Professor Scott, I was thinking as you were talking about 
the lender-of-last-resort. The classical theory of lender-of-last-resort as I 
remember my economics history, was Mister Walter Bagehot, who was the 
publisher of The Economist magazine, and he said, “Lend freely, but at high 




Well you’re making a good point. Let’s go back to the 2008 crisis. 
This was a particular problem for banks under the discount window.  The 
Fed had a 50-basis point penalty rate for borrowing at the window when the 
crisis occurred, and lo and behold, nobody came to them to borrow. They 
knew the banks were in trouble, so they lowered the rate to 25 basis points, 
still a penalty, this is over market rate. Still nobody came. Why? 
 Because the banks were concerned that if they came to the Fed for 
money, even though the Fed had no obligation to disclose the identity of 
particular borrowers, that this would leak out, through reports that the Fed 
issued where you could kind of infer who the borrower was.  
 If somebody borrowed in the North Carolina area, it must be Bank 
of America.  So, they still did not borrow. So, what the Fed then did is create 
something called a Term Auction Facility where anybody could borrow at 
an auction rate. And then they borrowed because you couldn’t tell the good 
banks from the bad banks who were borrowing.  
 So, here is the dilemma, that was exposed in 2008. If the penalty rate 
is high, or if you specifically penalize the borrower, and then that particular 
2018 THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 17 
borrower could leak out they won’t borrow, the situation gets worse, and, 
you even have a more difficult problem. 
 So, in principle, they should pay a penalty, whether it should be a 
penalty in the form of a penalty rate or something else, for instance discipline 
or replacement of management, or some other consequence. There should 
definitely be a consequence. But maybe after the borrowing. 
JUDGE BEA: 
Was it just too much information out there? Just too much 
information out there, as to who’s borrowing? 
MR. SCOTT: 




Judge Bea, I’d like to comment on your question, which I think is a 
very important one.  
There are studies showing that the Term Auction Facility and other 
lending facilities established by the Federal Reserve allowed Bank of 
America to borrow huge amounts while paying an average interest rate of 
0.8%. Goldman Sachs paid an average interest rate of 1.4%. No ordinary 
firm could have borrowed money at such ultra-low rates during 2008 and 
2009. Thus, once the federal government allows too-big-to-fail institutions 
to exist, the government essentially decides that, like nuclear reactors, 
they’re not going to allow those institutions to fail.  
 The Fed and the Treasury did everything necessary to subsidize and 
prop up big financial conglomerates after Lehman Brothers failed. Those 
institutions received enormous subsidies until the crisis was over.  
MR. SCOTT: 
Yes, in some cases.  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
I have another point, which is related to that. I mean, what Hal says 
is essentially the standard dilemma. We charge you a fair market rate, you’re 
down to fail. If we charge you a lower rate, you’re bound to get an excessive 
subsidy. One of the things that’s wrong about the whole federal reserve 
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lending system is that it only allows the government to act as a lender who 
is restricted to taking on interest on loans.  
 In my view, if you start thinking about the flexibility which was 
abused but nonetheless available to the Federal Housing Financial Agency, 
what they do is they allow the government to take an equity piece of some 
sort or another. 
 What you can say is, we’re going to give you a situation where 
you’ve got 2% interest, but by the way, when this project goes up in value, 
welcome, my friend, to an equity kicker because we now own 15% of this 
business, which we may sell it in the open market at some point or another, 
but it will allow for the recoupment.  
 Essentially what happens is you don’t want people in the lending 
business to have to make an all-or-nothing judgment at the front end on 
success or failure. You would rather have a workout with two components.  
An absolute fixed payment plus a contingent payment if all goes well.  
 Now, with the AIG situation, the Federal Reserved didn’t have that 
flexibility, so Davis Polk essentially created a sham transaction in which you 
a third-party corporation announced that it was taking equity. The problem 
is that entity was owned completely by the United States government, and 
then you’ve got litigation before Judge Wheeler in D.C. and Erlenmeyer I 
think in New York.  
  You don’t want to essentially force people to work under the wrong 
statutory framework, which will then lead to the wrong result. What you 
really have to understand, and this is my next-to-last sentence, is when you 
call The Fed the lender-of-last-resort, the word “lender” is a very dangerous 
term because it limits the way in which government could provide relief. 
 No private party, which is going to come and give some kind of 
assistance, would say either it’s going to be a loan or nothing, and we should 




I’d like to make a comment about this whole question of too-big-to-
fail, because I don’t think people are making enough in the way of 
distinctions on this issue. 
 When we say “banks,” when you read in the press that the banks 
were too big to fail there’s some distinctions that should be made. Bank 
holding companies are ordinary corporations. I don’t think that they are too 
big to fail, and I think what we saw in the financial crisis when Lehman 
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failed, was that there isn’t any interconnection between these very large 
financial institutions so that when one fails it will drag down others.  
 Now, the too-big-to-fail institutions are the banks. The ones that are 
the deposit-takers, that have deposit insurance, and they are gigantic. We 
have four of them, that are over, about or over the trillion-dollar mark. Those 
institutions are too big to fail. They are not covered by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
They are still under the jurisdiction of the FDIC, which has nothing like the 
resources that is necessary to deal with the failure of a bank.  
 Let’s leave aside bank holding companies. So, we are still in the 
position where we have no way of handling the failure of one of these very 
large institutions. 
 Now I’m not, at this point, trying to propose any kind of action, but 
what we ought to understand is that the Dodd-Frank Act, which was intended 
to deal with the too-big-to-fail problem, is a total failure at that, because it 
doesn’t deal with the real institutions that could cause a financial crisis if one 
of them failed. 
JUDGE BEA: 
Professor Wilmarth, you are suggesting that we go back to a division 
under the Glass-Steagall Act. Because I remember when the Glass-Steagall 
Act was gotten rid of, the idea was that our banks here in America could not 
compete with the foreign banks that were doing universal banking, and that 
the reason we were abolishing Glass-Steagall, was to be able to compete in 
the universal globalist market. Is that not a problem? 
MR. WILMARTH: 
There’s been a lot of discussion about whether U.S. banks could 
compete with foreign universal banks if we reestablished the Glass-Steagall 
Act.  During the 1990’s, European universal banks said they couldn’t 
compete with our major institutions, including the specialized commercial 
banks like J.P Morgan & Co. and Citigroup and the specialized investment 
banks like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch.  
 In other words, our institutions were doing extremely well in 
international markets before Glass-Steagall was repealed. I believe that if we 
go back to Glass-Steagall, we would have institutions that are more 
specialized, more focused, better managed, and more effective at what they 
do. In addition, we would not have the massive conflict of interests created 
by universal banking. 
 Giant universal banks have repeatedly gotten themselves into big 
problems because they’re trying to do everything and the range of their 
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activities create huge challenges for effective management. When you try to 






Banking crises are almost universally caused by bad loans, not by 
securities activities. So, if you want to make sure that you’re not subsidizing 
the banking system, let them do everything but making loans.  
  The idea behind broadening their powers was in terms of risk, so 
that you would diversify their activities to decrease the overall risk of their 
enterprise. That idea, to me, is totally valid. And so, I don’t think we want to 
go back to the world in which if the bank part goes down, the whole thing 




  Can I add to that, also? And that is that the reason why there was 
permission for bank holding companies to acquire securities firms and other 
kinds of financial institutions, was because if you look at the data, you will 
see that most of the financing that is done in this country is done through the 
securities markets. 
 And the trend is all in that direction. The banks have been basically 
flat in terms of the financing that they provide to the corporate world.  
 So, if you want to have successful financial institutions, you cannot 
freeze them into a position where they are basically losing their role in the 
economy. They have to be allowed, as I see it, to compete in the areas that 
are growing, and that is the securities markets. 
 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Yes, I agree with all of this, and I’d like to make one other point. 
You always want to reverse engineer past failures; it may not cure against 
future mistakes but at least you don’t make the same dumb mistake twice, 
and certainly if you start looking back at, say, banking practices in the 1930’s 
and 40’s, it was very common to have situations where the loans would be 
limited to 50% of asset value, very low, and, it turns out you, don’t get a lot 
of leverage and you don’t get yourself a lot of failures. And what we then 
did, is we decided, no, we want to goose up home ownership as an 
independent ideal.  
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 Anytime you have an end-state ideal, it’s a mistake. If it turns out 
that home ownership is good, it should be able to survive without having to 
receive crazy subsidies, which arises when government tells the banks, “W-
we would like you to lend at 80 or 90%, or sometimes even 98%.”  
 Well, nobody’s going to do that unless you give them a guarantee. 
So, what you do is you then have the implicit Fanny and Freddie guarantee. 
These implicit guarantees are always terrible because you don’t know 
exactly how much they cost. They’re not on the books. In addition, they also 
generate some collateral obligation on the ban, such as making risky 
community redevelopment loans, which are, generally speaking, a complete 
disaster.  
 And then the economic bill comes due because of the social failure. 
Going forward, you have to let banks compete in markets in which there is 
potential growth securities and so forth, but you cannot go back to another 
system in which there are any implicit guarantees of their risky loans.  
 If we were to take that unwise course again, we will see a repetition 
of what happened in 2008. Even if Fanny and Freddie may be out of that next 
round, there’s some federal housing bureau that’ll pick up the slack, because 
the political situation calls for subsidies for racial and non-racial reasons 
alike, as if we will beat the odds is we take a huge number of losing bets, and 
then somehow assume that through the law of large numbers that this new 
strategy will all work out. 
 Or, as in the old days in the Jewish garment businesses was the joke, 
“you don’t make up what you lose on every piece by having large volume,” 
and that’s something that the lenders in the United States seems not to have 
learned. 
MR. WILMARTH: 
Could I provide a brief response? In my view, the key catalysts for 
the crisis were mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations 
and credit default swaps.  
 Banks securitized really bad mortgage loans, and they sold 
mortgage-backed securities around the world pretending that they were 
sound investments, just like the big universal banks that sold foreign bonds 
in the 1920’s. Banks obtained credit default swaps, which were a form of 
insurance, from firms like AIG to convince people that “someone will step 
in to cover these mortgage-backed securities if things go wrong.” 
  During the 2000’s, as during the 1920’s, we combined banking with 
securities and insurance, and allowed universal banks to sell what were really 
terrible securities as if they were sound, guaranteed investments. When 
everything blew up, Uncle Sam had to step in because the institutions that 
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were securitizing bad mortgages and selling mortgage-backed securities 
were so gigantic that they couldn’t be allowed to fail. 
 Universal banking also created perverse incentives because the big 
banks said to themselves, “We’re not putting these loans on our own books. 
We can package them up into securities, sell them around the world, get triple 
A ratings by bribing the credit rating agencies, and pay some more fees to 
AIG to obtain credit default swaps to back up the securities.”  
 Thus, I would emphasize the pervasive conflicts of interest and 
perverse incentives created by universal banking.  
 There was an interesting article about Deutsche Bank the other day. 
Deutsche Bank is one of the biggest European universal banks. The article 
pointed out that the shareholders of Deutsche Bank received something like 
15 billion euros of dividends since 2001. In contrast, senior executives at 
Deutsche Bank received 71 billion of euros in bonuses. The universal 
banking franchise has been a bonanza for the insiders. They have made out 
like bandits. Shareholders have not done nearly so well. Meanwhile, 




Yeah, one comment, of course, on what you said. We’ve been 
debating this for years, but the way it was phrased is that the banks sold these 
mortgage-backed securities around the world. 
 In fact, they were bought, is the other way to look at it. They were 
bought around the world, and why were they bought around the world? 
Because the government’s housing policy here in the United States caused a 
gigantic bubble.  
 A bubble that was far beyond any we’d ever had in the past, and 
what was happening in the bubble is that people were taking out mortgages 
with good, high rates on them, the banks were willing to lend to them, or 
others were willing to lend to them, because there were no defaults. There 
were never any defaults, or very few at least when there’s a bubble. Because 
everyone can refinance in the United States without any problem.  
 So, you never see defaults, but you see high rates, and people in 
Europe and elsewhere around the world, wanted these obligations. So, the 
banks actually were running out of the available mortgages as things got 
hotter and hotter towards 2008 and began to use credit default swaps.  
 Now, I want to say one thing, you can use a credit default swap to 
imitate an actual mortgage-backed security, which is what they did. But I 
want to say one thing about credit default swaps, very complicated subject, 
of course. 
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 But Lehman Brothers was a big player in the credit default swap 
market. When they failed, suddenly, without any warning, the credit default 
swap market kept operating all through the financial crisis.  
 So, don’t get frightened by something like a credit default swap. It 
turns out that it is not as harmful as people suggest it is. And it is very useful 
for institutions to manage their risk. And what we’ve done with credit default 
swaps since the crisis in the Dodd-Frank Act is to make that much more 
difficult, and also to set up a set of institutions financial market utilities, 
they’re called which are now backed by The Fed, and which will be the cause 
of the next crisis. 
 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Next crisis. Yeah. 
 
MR. WALLISON: 
You’ve got it. 
 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Just one sort of comment on this stuff. One of the things about 
regulation and about financial businesses is the way in which they look at 
their book of business. 
  Essentially, if you’re a responsible financial company, you start 
thinking about diversification and all the rest of that stuff, by looking at an 
entire portfolio of assets to measure its internal stability.  
 You may have some credit default swaps or other kinds of derivative 
arrangements that may look highly loaded in one direction or the other, but 
if you’ve got physical assets on the other side of the portfolio, that to 
complement them. the volatility of the portfolio is far lower than the 
volatility of one of its components, taken in isolation.  
 When a regulator comes in, it turns out that there are often 
jurisdictional boundary lines. Hence it is often the case that the default swaps 
are going to be regulated by one guy and the physical assets are going to be 
regulated by another.  Each, of them are going to see an unstable portfolio 
because each can’t take into account the other portion of the combined 
operation. This form of regulatory provincialism tends to exacerbate risks 
for regulated market institutions. 
 The reason I chimed in with Peter is because essentially what we 
have now are these regulatory hothouses, which are going to have blinkered 
vision, because they are only getting limited information, which leads to 
systematic mistake with respect to the volatility of the portfolios, which in 
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turn leads to erroneous regulations and market interventions, it’s likely to get 
them wrong. Thank you. 
 No, I mean smart regulation. Trust it to Peter and me. And Arthur. 
And Hal. You know, we do a fine job. 
 
JUDGE BEA: 
 I’d like to open the session to questions from the audience. Now, I 
would ask you two things: when you ask a question, identify who you are 
and where you’re from. And secondly, make it a question. Thank you.  
So, first of all, here in front.  
 
AUDIENCE: 
  Thank you, my name is Bert Ely, I’m a banking consultant here in 
Washington, and very active with the Federal Society’s financial institutions 
practice group.  
  Following up on Professor Wilmarth’s comments, I have a very 
simple question for the panel: what should be the federal government’s 
response, if any, should a funding crisis and consequent contagion erupt in 
the shadow banking world, and given the requirements of mark-to-market 
accounting, trigger substantial capital losses in FDIC insured banks, which 
in turn triggers the costly failure of some of those banks? Again, a very 
simple question.  
 
JUDGE BEA: 
Who wants to take this one?  
 
MR. WALLISON: 
I think it was directed at Wilmarth.  
 
MR. WILMARTH: 
My simple-minded response is to change the status quo.  The status 
quo is unacceptable because I agree that our next crisis is likely to start within 
the shadow banking system and spread to banks, as the last one did. 
 Would it be a magic bullet to treat all short-term debt claims payable 
at par as deposits and to force all that short-term money into chartered and 
supervised banks? Maybe it’s not a magic bullet, but at least you would know 
where the short-term money claims are, and you would have an opportunity 
to regulate them and charge deposit insurance premiums and do other things 
to control the growth of short-term money claims. Right now, we don’t even 
know where a lot of those claims are. 
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 The regulators don’t know, for example, the full scope of the repo 
market. Credit default swaps are still a mystery in many respects.  The 
regulators’ lack of knowledge about short-term claims in the capital markets 
was a fundamental problem in 2007 and 2008. Regulators didn’t know that 
AIG had $80 billion of credit default swaps backing up collateralized debt 
obligations and another $500 billion of credit default swaps backing up loans 
made by European banks.  In October 2008, regulators suddenly discovered 
that allowing AIG to fail would threaten many of the world’s leading 
financial intuitions.  
 In fact, $50 billion of the bailout money given to AIG was used by 
AIG to pay off credit default swaps to major financial institutions, including 
almost every leading financial conglomerate in the United States and Europe.  
 If AIG had defaulted on its credit default swaps, the CDS market 
would have collapsed, and a number of big institutions would have been in 
serious trouble. So, the AIG bailout was a CDS bailout, among other things.  
  
JUDGE BEA: 
 A dissenting opinion from Professor Scott.  
MR. SCOTT: 
 Well, just on that. 
 
MR. WALLISON: 
There’s so much to disagree with. Let me just say one thing and that 
is all of this, all of this faith in regulation is remarkable when you understand 
that the banks that got into trouble, as Arthur was talking about, were all 
heavily regulated, and the regulators were inside them every day.  
 And so, still they didn’t know what was going on. What happens 
with regulation is that people believe, like Arthur does, that regulation stops 
risk-taking, and as a result of that, they put more money in banks or make 
more investments in banks, when if they were ... aware of what the risks 
were, instead of relying on the regulators, they wouldn’t.  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Look, I have another point. One of the things about these credit 
default swaps. 
JUDGE BEA: 
I’ve got to call on Professor Scott. 
  
26 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 25 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Oh, call on him. Why would I interfere? 
MR. SCOTT: 
Just a factual point. if you look at the exposures on the CDS portfolio 
of AIG and look at the major counterparties. You take Goldman Sachs as an 
example.  
 Goldman Sachs had 18% of its capital at risk from the failure of AIG. 
18%. That’s large number, but it’s not close to insolvency. And that 18% 
number doesn’t count the CDS’s that Goldman purchased on AIG itself as a 
hedge against the inability of AIG to pay off on the CDS’s. So, if you take 
that into account, that the exposure of counterparties was limited, is that 
surprising?  
 Risk 101. You don’t put all your eggs in one basket to a counterparty. 
And I think Goldman understood that idea.  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
I was going to make a similar point, which is to say... 
 
MR. SCOTT: 
So, the fact of the matter is, Art, if AIG had not been saved by the 
Fed, Goldman would’ve been fine.  
MR. WILMARTH: 





Other counterparties were in similar positions.  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Yeah, look, I mean one of the other things to understand about 
Goldman is these were not just hedges as bare promises, they also took 
security interests of one kind or another, I’m not mistaken, right? 
MR. SCOTT 
That’s counted in the 18%. 
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MR. EPSTEIN: 
You know all the technical stuff, but the basic point that I’m trying 
to make is simple: that financial markets with their repos are organized in a 
way which allows for instantaneous foreclosures independent of the usual 
rules on mortgage markets. That also kind of protects things; you have to 
protect Goldman in order to get out of AIG because otherwise Goldman will 
protect itself. 
 The other point I wanted to make on mark-to-market, which is a two-
fold answer. To the extent that you have readily ascertainable market prices 
on various assets, marking to market on a daily basis is perfectly sensible. 
But what happened in 1988, and which could happen again, is we’re trying 
to mark-to-market those kinds of securities that do not have a ready market, 
and then in effect what you do is deny a regulated bank the thing that most 
of the banks want most, which is the ability to say, “I’m going to keep my 
assets off the market during a bad period of time, and wait ‘til some time 
later.”  
 And it’s that inability to delay then forces them to sell into hostile 
markets, which then lowers the price even further, at which point the cycle 
starts to repeat. Instead of thinking of this bank as a regulated institution, 
think of it as a single owner of a particular asset, then ask yourself whether 
or not in bad markets the owner of a house is under the duty to sell. And I 
think in that last case, you’ fundamentally want to reject the mark-to-market. 
It is valuable when prices are ascertainable; otherwise, it can prove quite 
perverse. 
JUDGE BEA: 
  In the back. Question. 
AUDIENCE: 
 About these systemically important institutions it seems to me that 
once they have been designated as that, the federal government’s taking a lot 
of control of the internal governance away from the shareholders, and to me, 
that should really be classified as it is taking them.  
 You have the government instituting for public purposes and taking 
control away from people’s private property interests in the company that 
they own share in. you know, I think changing that would really improve a 
lot of the things from the judicial philosophy, at least.  
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Did I hear you talk about takings? My answer for that takings is half 
the problem. But there’s a second half of the problem, which is whether or 
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not when the government takes, it gives you just compensation for the loss, 
so that the shareholders regard themselves as better off than before. And in 
fact, if you were running a sensible bailout program where you inject money 
into the situation, which gives you liquidity and takes back the senior 
interests, that’s fine.  
 And that was maybe, but arguably the situation that you have with 
FHFA and Fannie and Freddie with its 2008 September bailout when it took 
a preferred stock with a 10% dividend on money that was put in. But when 
they then switched the terms of compensation in August 2012 so that the 
amount left over to the shareholders is nothing, ever, and then announce that 
since you’re getting nothing, ever, you should be extremely happy. Which is 
the government’s position. 
 The reason why a takings issue is always raised is that there are two 
sides to the problem, and what happens in many of these cases, most notably 
with the GSE’s, is that nothing whatsoever is given to the shareholders when 
their wealth was confiscated. What was so terrible about this episode 
politically is that it revealed a bipartisan willingness to steal on both the 
Republican and the Democratic side. I’ve written about this problem for 
years, on behalf of these hedge funds.7 
 And I’m always amazed at the casual arguments that people make 
saying that we regard FHFA as a faithful agent of the individuals whom it’s 
milking every dollar that they have. 
JUDGE BEA: 
 Alright. Another question. 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, D.C. Circuit Refuses To See Limits To 
Government Power And Inexcusably Upholds The Net Worth Sweep, 
FORBES, Mar. 3, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2017/03 
/03/d-c-circuit-refuses-to-see-limits-to-government-power-and-
inexcusably 
-upholds-the-net-worth-sweep/#4c0899924167; see also, Richard A. 
Epstein, Will Fannie and Freddie Shareholders Be Able to Set Aside the 
Third Amendment? Judge Royce Lamberth's Indefensible Decision Is Only 
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AUDIENCE: 
 I’m Kai Albert from Port Angeles, Washington. I’d like to ask the 
panelists, if you had a magic wand you could wave over Dodd-Frank, what 
parts of it would you amend or repeal, and then turning to reality, what, if 
anything, do you think, is it realistic to expect is likely to happen with regard 
to Dodd-Frank reform during the current presidential term?  
MR. WALLISON: 
Well, let me try that.  
MR. SCOTT  
I’ll answer the second. It’s easier than the first. There is a bipartisan 
bill that was introduced this week, which basically tries to reduce the burdens 
of Dodd-Frank and limit them to, in some cases to banks that are under $250 
billion, and in other cases, even smaller banks. Banks at which, provisions 
of Dodd-Frank. 
 Bipartisan, I would say there’s a very good chance it will pass. But 
I think that’ll be it. There is such a narrow majority of the Republicans in the 
Senate, and such disagreement among those Republicans that I think any 
other practical change to Dodd-Frank other than for smaller banks, which I 
think we’ll see, will not pass. If I were czar, I would sort of scrap Dodd-




Anybody else want to chime in? 
MR. WALLISON: 
Yeah, I’d mention two things right off the bat, and that is the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council should be closed down, it’s a danger. 
And to the extent that they go into things such as activities, which many 
people have been for, that is a real danger when they are going to be able to 
stop entire markets from operating, or entire industries from operating, 
because they don’t like the way they are operating.  
 Now, that probably won’t happen in the Trump administration, but 
it could well happen in the next administration if it turns out to be from the 
Left. 
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MR. EPSTEIN: 
First of all, I think the CFPB, you know, marked for extinction 
would not be a bad thing, and reassign its regulatory authority to other 
agencies, which are perhaps better able to do it. But the one that I particularly 
hate, which is self-contained and separate, is the Durbin Amendment, which 
sort of wrecked the debit card markets for many years by announcing that 
the interchange system, which had been the greatest success in financial 
innovation over the last 15 years was completely crazy because it allowed, 
essentially people to charge the debit card-holders a transaction fee, which 
the regulators wanted to drive as close as possible to zero. 
 That’s separate. I mean, people like Todd Zywicki who may end up 
running, if the Lord is kind to us, the CFPB has essentially killed off all sorts 
of innovation in this particular banking section, and the reason why I think 
it may be reparable is not only are its effects particularly odious, in many 
cases, but because the Durbin Amendment is separable from the rest of the 
statute.  And at that particular point, the interaction and overlap problems are 




 I certainly agree that regulatory relief for traditional community 
banks is long overdue. Among other things, why are we imposing Basel’s 
international capital requirements on traditional community banks? It makes 
no sense to do that.  A strong leverage capital requirement would clearly be 
sufficient.  Traditional community banks are doing what banks are supposed 
to be doing, and they’re the lifeblood of most of our small or medium-sized 
communities. 
If we want to have a culture that encourages start-up businesses, we 
need more community banks and we need our existing community banks to 
thrive. We’re loading them down with way too many mandates. I hope 
regulatory relief for community banks can be accomplished, if nothing else. 
 
MR. SCOTT: 
Could I just add that I don’t think the villain of the piece is all Dodd-
Frank, and this is what Arthur has just alluded to, big villains of the piece 
reside outside the United States in the form of the Basel Committee and the 
Financial Stability Board.  
 The two major regulations that have really affected growth, 
economic growth in this country, are capital and liquidity requirements. 
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Those did not originate in the Dodd-Frank legislation, it came out of the 
Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board.  
 So, how we deal with these international organizations going 
forward in terms of providing regulatory relief is absolutely crucial. This is 





Thank you, my name is Carl Domino. I am an attorney but since 
1972 I’ve been a money manager in the equity markets, and as a general 
proposition I’d say that the big declines we’ve had always been caused by 
something different. 
 Inflation in the 70’s, portfolio insurance, the dot com bubble, the 
financial crisis.  
 So, as a money manager I’m always looking for the next thing. I 
mean, everything you said is great, I’ve studied it, I’m not sure if that’s not 
the last. 
 I don’t know if any of you had looked at what Jamie Diamond said 
was a fraud, it’s very small now, it’s growing rapidly, and that’s Bitcoin. It 
looks like the tulip bubble in Holland.  
 So, the question is this: have any of you looked at it, have a sense of 
the danger it poses to the capital of markets, and is there an administrative 
body that should be, if not regulating, at least closely monitoring the growth 
of Bitcoin? 
JUDGE BEA: 
Anybody want to talk on that one?  
MR. WILMARTH: 
I’ve read a little bit about the recent failure of a Bitcoin market in 
Japan.  No one has yet explained why that market failed, but many investors 
lost their money and the money just disappeared. My feeling is that a market 
in which suddenly investors’ money just disappears, and nobody has any 
explanation for it, looks like a Ponzi scheme.  
 I therefore think that Bitcoin could well be a Ponzi scheme, which is 
operating on the greater fool theory.  I have yet to see any clear explanation 
about where expected payoffs on Bitcoin investments will come from. 
Everybody is promised payoffs, but where will the payoffs come from? And 
investors do not know who invented Bitcoin or who is behind it.  
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  I am perplexed that a market like Bitcoin, which no one is vouching 
for, which no one is regulating or overseeing, and where some collapses have 
already occurred, can continue to attract a lot of money.  
MR. WALLISON:  
Let me. Yeah, I’d like to say something about that because, and 
probably Richard does too, but look, our economy is great because of 
innovation. And if people lose money on something like Bitcoin because 
they’ve speculated on it and they’ve lost. If it’s a Ponzi scheme, then there’s 
a criminal violation there, but let’s not get into the business of regulating 
innovation. Let’s let it work out, and if people lose money, that’s their 
problem. 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
Now, I have the following explanation, I heard the following 
statement: you cannot possibly imagine how people are allowed to put in 
monies into a banking system which has systemic failures when there’s no 
real accountability. 
As I listen to that statement, it seems to me you have to close down 
every bank in the United States because they all have had very similar 
problems. Regulatory failure in this country is much more frequent overall 
than it is for example in Canada, where they’ve never had this particular 
problem. 
 And so, the danger that you really have about this is if you want to 
apply that to Bitcoin, you’re going to have to apply it to everything else and 
at that particular point it may well be that we’re going to start going back to 
only having gold bullion to run our exchange markets. 
JUDGE BEA: 
Last question.  
AUDIENCE: 
Thanks. Professor Wilmarth, first of all, thank you for coming today. 
you decry the tragedy of the federal government having to spend $850 
million to bail out Citigroup and Bank of America, and I understand that 
your take on what happened in 2008 is a little different from the other 
panelists, but still, we can take certainly as a matter of just judicial notice, 
that there is a strong push coming out of Congress to readdress income 
inequality by asking financial institutions to make loans to people who 
otherwise would not be qualified. 
2018 THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 33 
 And it’s my understanding that FHA losses are astronomical in terms 
of, in comparison to other forms of loans, so in that sense the government 
spends plenty of money on behalf of the taxpayers for its own problems.  
 Could you take a position on that form of lending? Do you decry that 
socially-induced lending also, along with your other concerns?  
MR. WILMARTH: 
Oh, yes. I’ve said repeatedly that the idea about getting people into 
homes they can’t afford makes no sense at all. After all, what is dishonorable 
about renting? We essentially made it possible for millions of people to buy 
homes they couldn’t afford, and then their homes were foreclosed, they lost 
everything, they lost their credit ratings, meaning they’re ruined for years. 
  Home ownership for everyone was a horribly misguided policy. I 
agree that the federal government and the largest banks share a lot of 
responsibility for the housing disaster.  
 Unfortunately, the biggest banks found that subprime lending was a 
very profitable business for about five years. It proved to be an unmitigated 
disaster over the longer term. 
MR. EPSTEIN: 
I have a one-sentence answer. One-word answer. It’s called “rent.”  
JUDGE BEA: 
On that optimistic note, I’ve got the hook over here. So, can we thank 
our panelists. Thank you very much. 
  
